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Abstract 
The chapter addresses some of the tensions between sovereignty, 
international human rights review and legitimacy, and bring these findings to bear 
on the proposals for reform of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) that 
would reduce its authority over national legislatures and judiciaries. The objectives 
of such review are not obvious, the causes of noncompliance are contested, as is the 
legality of dynamic treaty interpretation; all of which hamper efforts to assess 
proposed improvements. Section 1 presents some relevant aspects of the ECtHR. 
Section 2 reviews some of the recent criticism against the ECtHR practice of judicial 
review to protect human rights in ‘well-functioning’ democracies, in terms of various 
forms of legitimacy deficits. It also presents some of the recent proposals for reform 
of the ECtHR. Section 3 lays out some reasons why such judicial review of 
majoritarian democratic decision-making may be defensible, also for well 
functioning democracies. Section 4 responds to some of the criticisms, and presents a 
partial defence. Some standard objections are not well targeted against the practices 
of the ECtHR, partly due to the division of responsibility between it and national 
public bodies, and the different roles of legislators and of judiciaries. Section 5 
returns to the proposals presented in section 2. Section 6 concludes by considering 
some of the important remaining normative challenges, this partial defence 
notwithstanding. 
Introduction  
Worries about international judicial review of human rights have increased in recent 
years.1  The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the court it 
establishes, the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR), have sustained 
particularly much criticism, not least in the Nordic countries and the UK.2 In these 
countries vocal critics have included government commissions and politicians. Such 
misgivings culminated in some of the proposals entertained at the Brighton 
conference on reforms of the ECtHR in April 18-20. Several solutions would 
essentially return sovereignty to the states, pruning the powers of the ECtHR not 
only over the UK, but across the board. Some protests against international judicial 
review arise from general misgivings about juridification and internationalization 
wrought by other influential European courts and international treaty bodies, such 
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as the Court of Justice of the European Union.  In addition, judicial review by the 
human rights judiciary also raise particular puzzles of legitimacy, especially when 
performed on democratically enacted legislation. The changes to the ECHR ventured 
by the British government illustrate some central challenges facing the human rights 
judiciary as a whole. These proposals seek to enhance the legitimacy of the ECtHR 
by reducing its authority over national legislatures and judiciaries. The present 
chapter addresses some of these tensions between sovereignty, international human 
rights review and legitimacy, and seeks to bring these findings to bear on proposals 
for reform of the human rights judiciary. The objectives of such review are not 
obvious, the causes of noncompliance are contested, as is the legality of dynamic 
treaty interpretation; all of which hamper efforts to assess proposed improvements. 
These concerns merit attention for several reasons. They stem from states 
whose ‘democratic spirit’ can hardly be doubted, whose citizens enjoy comparatively 
high scores on most standards of good governance, democracy and political trust in 
government, and with low levels of relative poverty.3 On the one hand, their 
scepticism fits with Moravcsik’s claim that resistance to the ECHR was higher in 
precisely such states, rather than where governments are afraid that the opposition 
will backslide on human rights commitments if they got to power ((Moravcsik, 
1995)). On the other hand we would suspect that such states have little to complain 
about, since they can be expected to seldom violate the human rights conventions 
they have signed. Statistics bear this out: in 2011 the Nordic states and the UK were 
responsible for 1,5% of the violations found by the ECtHR. This is much less than the 
per capita would suggest, since these states include 10.7 % of the population of the 
Council of Europe member states.4 
Their general respect for human rights coupled with the relatively small 
burden of such international criticisms should give us particular ground for concern 
when public debates in these states concern the alleged democratic deficit of 
international law in general, and of human rights law and the ECtHR in particular. If 
wide spread, such protests may hamper future compliance and treaty ratification, 
possibly with good reason. So why are significant actors in these ‘well behaved’ 
states worried about international human rights review, even though they have 
comparatively little to worry about? 
Indeed, similar unease about unaccountable international judicialisation may 
partly explain the path to the Lisbon Treaty was paved with negative referendums.5 
We may expect more tensions when the EU ratifies the European Convention on 
Human Right, and thus become subject to judicial review by the ECtHR. This raises 
intriguing questions, inter alia about the sort of political entity the EU is and 
becomes, and the relationship between the Court of Justice of the European Union 
and the ECtHR. EU ratification of the ECHR adds urgency to the worries of the 
latter’s legitimacy deficit, not least if the Lisbon treaty alleviates the democratic 
deficit of the EU. Insofar as the EU’s rules become more legitimate in the eyes of 
citizens and authorities, judicial review over human rights issues in the EU may be 
more suspect. The upshot is that concerns about the normative legitimacy of judicial 
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review of human rights by international courts merits scrutiny. 
To address these issues, this article proceeds in six parts. Section 1 presents 
some relevant aspects of the ECtHR. Section 2 reviews some of the recent criticism 
against the ECtHR practice of judicial review to protect human rights in ‘well-
functioning’ democracies, in terms of various forms of legitimacy deficits. It also 
presents some of the recent proposals for reform of the ECtHR. Section 3 lays out 
some reasons why such judicial review of majoritarian democratic decision-making 
may be defensible, also for well functioning democracies. I suggest two ways the 
unit of analysis needs to be clearer that often stated: we need to assess the practice as 
a whole, applied to both democracies and other states, and we must consider the 
need not only that states comply with human rights, but also that citizens are 
assured that such is the case. Section 4 responds to some of the criticisms, and 
presents a partial defence. Some standard objections are not well targeted against the 
practices of the ECtHR, partly due to the division of responsibility between it and 
national public bodies, and the different roles of legislators and of judiciaries. Section 
5 returns to the proposals presented in section 2. Section 6 concludes by considering 
some of the important remaining normative challenges, this partial defence 
notwithstanding. 
1. The European Court of Human Rights 
The European Court of Human Rights is an institution of the Council of Europe, set 
up in 1959 on the basis of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. The 
Preamble states that the convention is a first step toward collective European 
enforcement of certain rights of the UN Declaration. This early warning system 
should help prevent lapses into totalitarianism by means of a court that hold states 
to account for human rights violations ((Woolf, 2005)). These are mainly civil and 
political rights, but also rights concerning such issues as education and anti-
discrimination. The objective of the Convention slowly changed to fine-tune “well-
functioning democracies.” With the new crop of member states of the Council of 
Europe the ECtHR has again had to focus on less stable democracies.  
The ECtHR monitors the ECHR, and is among the most powerful treaty based 
courts. Still, the ECtHR respects States’ discretion in several ways. A) it accords states 
a  ‘Margin of Appreciation’ with regard to assess whether they are in compliance 
with the obligations of the ECHR ((Bernhardt, 1994)).  B) the ECtHR exercises what is 
sometimes referred to as ‘weak’ review. When the ECtHR finds a law or its 
application to be incompatible with the ECHR, this does not directly affect the 
validity of that law in the domestic legal system (ibid). C) When the ECtHR finds a 
state to be in violation of the ECHR, the state is still left with much leeway with 
regard to how to change its laws or procedures to secure compliance – in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity. 
With regard to procedure, a Chamber of seven members hears most cases, 
while a Grand Chamber of seventeen judges hears cases found to be of great 
importance (ECHR article 30). A judge from the accused Member State is always ex 
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officio member of the Court, to ensure relevant background information about 
national specifics (ECHR article 26(4)).  
The judgments against a Member State may include to give reparations to the 
particular individuals, as well as more ‘general measures’ necessary to avoid 
recurrence of violations. States have some freedom with regard to which such 
measures to take, though subject to monitoring by the Committee of Ministers 
composed of the foreign ministers of all Member States.6 The state may amend or 
add to its constitution, laws, regulations, or its administrative or judicial practices. 
The Committee of Ministers can employ a range of sanctions, ranging from the new 
infringement procedure under ECHR article 46(4), to different modes of bringing 
pressure on the noncompliant state,  suspension of voting rights in the Committee of 
Ministers, or even expulsion from the Council of Europe (Article 8 of the Statute of 
the Council of Europe).  
2. Backdrop: the legitimacy deficits of the human rights 
judiciary, especially of the ECtHR, and some proposals 
Legitimacy is a complex concept with several interrelated aspects which may best be 
illustrated by their absence. A body such as the ECtHR may be deemed illegitimate 
in the eyes of ordinary citizens because of its’ poor performance:  it is ineffective in 
securing or promoting certain objectives (cf. (Beetham and Lord, 1998), 31). Indeed, 
the objectives of such review are not obvious – we turn to that in section 3. 
Regardless of objectives, the ECtHR currently has a backlog of approximately 140000 
applications ((European Court of Human Rights, 2012c)), which is taken as a further 
sign of ineffective protection of human rights. For citizens complaining to the Court, 
this backlog may weaken their support for the Court – while the states may to the 
contrary be more accepting of the Court due to this lack of effectiveness. But states’ 
social acceptance seems weak when we address the next concern. 
Secondly, the ECtHR can be regarded as illegitimate because the signatory 
states fail to comply with the rulings of the Court. Indeed, 34000 of the cases are 
classified as ‘repetitive’ by the registry of the Court, meaning that the relevant 
government has failed to install suitable general measures to prevent violations 
identified in earlier cases.  
A third form of illegitimacy concerns the lack of legality. For the ECtHR this 
occurs insofar as state governments or administration hold that judges of the ECtHR 
interpret a treaty unduly creatively, too far beyond the intentions of the signatories 
and hence unlawful. Some hold that this is the case when the ECtHR openly 
undertakes ‘dynamic’ interpretation of the convention. However, complaining 
citizens and NGOs may either downplay such ‘illegality’, or hold that such 
interpretations are necessary for many treaties to further their objectives under new 
societal circumstances.  
Fourthly, the human rights judiciary may be accused of failing to be 
normatively justifiable. Thus all judicial review, also by domestic constitutional courts, 
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is often presented as undemocratic and generally unaccountable, and therefore 
normatively illegitimate in this sense ((Waldron, 2006)).  International courts or 
treaty bodies raises additional fears: a) the treaties are even less subject to citizens’ 
control than domestic constitutions, since they are more entrenched against popular 
and parliamentary preferences and more difficult to change.  
b) One consequence of such entrenchment is that the courts and treaty organs 
often resort to more dynamic modes of interpretation of the treaties. This raises 
further fears of domination by an unaccountable ‘juristocracy’.  
c) By design, the treaty organs will be largely staffed by officials who are even 
less accountable than their domestic counterparts. The members will be less familiar 
with national culture, constitutional traditions, and the legitimate expectations of the 
citizenry. Some, for instance domestic governments and administrations, fear that 
this lack of familiarity raises the likelihood of misjudgments about impacts and 
alternatives ((Østerud and Selle, 2006)).  
d) In addition, as a body the international court will be less accountable to the 
professional norms of their respective peers than are the judges of domestic courts.  
e) Adding to these risks, the increased number of international human rights 
treaties without a clear hierarchy may in the longer run bring familiar, possibly 
overstated fears wrought by the ‘fragmentation of international law.’  Forum 
shopping, divergent interpretation of the same norms and other factors may further 
reduce the power of legislatures and increase the ability of judges and courts to 
decide without much in the way of checks  ((Conforti, 2007)).  
f) Courts and other treaty bodies must also undertake complex and often 
controversial balancing among norms – including among human rights ((Tamanaha, 
2010)). Such weighing or balancing of norms and rights is something a legislature 
might be expected to do at least as well and responsibly as a treaty organ whose 
members may know little if anything about public management, local mores, 
preferences and opportunities. Thus human rights treaties with adjudicating bodies 
that perform judicial review raise understandable fears among democratically 
accountable executives of "Qui custodiet ipsos custodies”?  
Much of the recent criticism leveled against the ECtHR expresses such 
misgivings about the legitimacy of the court, in these various senses of ‘legitimacy.’  
No wonder that there were several proposals to reduce ECtHR’s alleged legitimacy 
challenges, voiced during the spring of 2012 in preparation for discussions at 
Brighton April 18-20, under the British chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe. Prime Minister David Cameron pointed to the vast backlog 
of the Court as a main challenge to effective performance, and a further delay of 
justice to wronged parties ((Cameron, 2012)). Some critics may also take the backlog 
as a sign that the Court is too ambitious in its rulings, meddling in issues beyond its 
proper mandate.  
Prime Minister Cameron maintained that part of the solution is to reduce the 
ECtHR’s authority relative to domestic bodies of governance. The solution is in short 
to give more priority to sovereignty over international human rights review. Thus 
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the British government circulated several reform proposals to ensure that the Court 
will heed democratic decisions by national parliaments more ((UK Government, 
2012)). Three proposed amendments merit particular scrutiny as a matter of 
normative political theory. 
Firstly, some hold that the ECHR should be amended to include a clear 
reference to the “Principle of Subsidiarity” ((UK Government, 2012), para 19 b) A 
“principle of subsidiarity” regulates how to allocate or use authority within a 
political or legal order, typically in those orders that disperse authority between a 
centre and various member units ((Follesdal, 1998b)). The principle holds that the 
burden of argument lies with attempts to centralize authority. Thus the conception of 
subsidiarity as laid out by the Lisbon Treaty holds that in those issue areas where the 
states and the EU share authority, the member states should decide - unless central 
action will ensure higher comparative efficiency or effectiveness in achieving the 
specified objectives ((Treaty of Lisbon, 2007)). According to the principle of 
subsidiarity, the ECtHR should only act to supplement the domestic legal system, and 
the burden of argument rests with proposals that give more authority to the 
international level.  
A second proposal is to amend the ECHR to instruct the Court to respect 
states’ “Margin of Appreciation.” This would be a codification of the Court’s long 
standing practice to grant states some leeway in some cases, so that the state has the 
final authority to determine whether certain policies are in compliance with the 
ECHR. 
A third proposal applies these principles to specify which cases the ECtHR 
should take on. The Court should not consider an application “if it is the same in 
substance as a matter that has been examined by a national court taking into account 
the rights guaranteed by the Convention, ((UK Government, 2012), para 23 b).  There 
are only two exceptions: if “the Court considers that: i) The national court clearly 
erred in its interpretation or application of the Convention rights; or ii) The 
application raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the 
Convention;..."  
The ECtHR and its President Sir Nicolas Bratza responded. In addition to the 
existing changes to reduce the backlog, the ECtHR urged several informal means, 
such as dialogue between Strasbourg and national courts, in the form of regular 
working meetings and “judicial dialogue through judgments” and possibly a system 
of advisory opinion jurisdiction ((European Court of Human Rights, 2012b), para 27-
28).  Judge Bratza has counseled that neither subsidiarity nor the margin of 
appreciation should be put in the ECHR. Such changes would not help reduce the 
case load of the court significantly, thus not enhance the effectiveness of the Court 
((Bratza, 2012)). In response, one might argue that such changes could still increase 
its normative legitimacy by giving greater weight to democratic sovereignty. 
The general tendency of these UK proposals is to grant more authority 
regarding human rights review to domestic rather than to regional bodies, and 
formalize this as amendments to the treaty. Assuming that they are made in good 
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faith, what are we to think of such attempts to enhance the legitimacy of the ECtHR? 
Several aspects require attention. One central issue is the objectives of such human 
rights review. Clarity about these objectives is required in order to determine how to 
assess these proposals, and how the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of 
appreciation should be justified, specified and institutionalized. 
3. In defence of International Judicial Review to protect 
Human Rights  
There are at least three reasons in principle for international judicial review, even for 
well-functioning democracies which largely comply with these legal human rights 
obligations anyway. They concern international peer pressure, domestic safeguard of 
minorities, and assurance of compliance. The first two may hold more obviously for 
citizens, and more indirectly for their governments, while the latter may also be 
supported by the executive branch that seeks to promote compliance with its 
decisions. This is not to say that these arguments support the present institutions 
and practices of the human rights judiciary in general, and the ECtHR in particular, 
but they indicate the kinds of arguments that may guide reforms. 
The following brief sketch takes as a normative starting point that the ‘global 
basic structure’ – the global set of social institutions which includes domestic, 
regional and international bodies - should be arranged so as to be trusted to respect, 
protect and further the best interests of individuals globally ((Follesdal, 2011)). I 
argue below that the citizenry should have good reasons to trust the institutions and 
their authorities to carry out these tasks. So institutions should not only be just, but 
also promote public trustworthiness that this is in fact the case. I submit that 
democratic rule is supported by such reasons, and go on to indicate reasons to favor 
democratic institutions that are constrained by a human rights judiciary over 
majoritarian systems of governance without such constraints. 
This normative starting point rests on several normative premises. Firstly, 
there is an assumption that citizens generally should be inculcated to, and be able to 
assume that almost all others share, a ‘sense of justice.’  The justification of the global 
set of institutions should be addressed to such individuals, motivated by what John 
Rawls called a ‘duty of justice’: 
“to support and comply with just institutions that exist and 
apply to us. It also constrains us to further just arrangements 
not yet established, at least when this can be done without too 
much cost to ourselves.” “ ... predicated on the belief that 
others will do their part” ((Rawls, 1971): 115, 336) 
I interpret this to mean that citizens are ‘contingent compliers’ in a game theoretical 
sense. They can only be expected to comply if they are assured that the institutions 
are just, and that others do their share. So citizens must not only have a normally 
effective sense of justice, but must also be sure that most others are similarly 
motivated. Note that for our purposes we can bracket much disagreement about the 
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substantive requirements of justice for the global basic structure, beyond 
maintaining that citizens have some obligation to promote human rights compliance 
even in other states than their own. 
The global set of institutions must satisfy two conditions if general 
compliance among such contingent compliers is to occur and be predictably stable. 
Firstly, the institutions must be normatively legitimate, by whatever defensible set of 
principles of legitimacy the normative theory defends. Secondly, citizens must also 
have reason to trust in the future compliance of other citizens and authorities with 
such fair institutions. In the absence of such trust even a group of persons known to 
be contingent compliers will have little reason to comply. Indeed, they may prefer to 
not comply unless institutions provide such assurance. 
I venture that democratic rule combined with constraints on legislatures in 
the form of judicial review of human rights may provide important forms of such 
assurance.   
I here present fairly standard case for democratic rule, agreed by a broad 
range of democratic theorists (cf. (Follesdal, 1998a), (Follesdal and Hix, 2006)). It is 
not intended as a complete definition, but rather as a statement about virtually all 
modern political systems that we would normally call ‘democratic’.   
1) Institutionally established procedures that regulate  
2) competition for control over political authority,  
3) on the basis of deliberation, 
4) where nearly all adult citizens are permitted to participate in 
5) an electoral mechanism where their expressed preferences over alternative 
candidates determine the outcome, 
6) in such ways that the government is responsive to the majority or to as many as 
possible.   
Essential to the case for democracy over alternative decision procedures is 
competitive elections. They are important to make policies and elected officials 
responsive to the preferences of citizens ((Powell, 2000)).  It must be possible for an 
‘opposition’ to form against the current leadership elites and policy status quo (e.g. 
(Dahl, 1971)).  Active opposition parties and media scrutiny are crucial for fact 
finding, agenda setting and assessments of the effectiveness of policies.  
On this line of argument, the normative case for democratic rule is 
comparative: Forms of democratic rule by means of competitive elections to choose 
policies and leaders are better than alternative constitutional arrangements for 
decision making. The claim is that such democratic accountability mechanisms 
ensure that the decisions can be trusted to be more reliably responsive to the best 
interests of the citizenry than other collective decision making arrangements. 
There are at least three reasons why citizens of such democracies may have 
good reason to subject their state to the human rights judiciary.  
One reason is based on citizens’ duty of justice to promote just institutions 
when they do not yet exist. This duty is expressed in one way by which politicians 
citizens vote into office, and their policies. In particular, ratification by one state is 
sometimes one way to promote ratification by other states whose citizens stand to 
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benefit from such review. This is because ratification by some states adds pressure 
on other states to also ratify – states whose ratification does make a difference to 
citizens. Beth Simmons notes that  
The single strongest motive for ratification in the absence of a 
strong value commitment is the preference that nearly all 
governments have to avoid the social and political pressures of 
remaining aloof from a multilateral agreement to which most of 
their peers have already committed themselves. 
((Simmons, 2009), 13).  
One consequence of this impact of the human rights judiciary is that the 
assessment of reforms cannot be restrained to intra-state effects, but must also heed 
the impact in less democratic states that form part of the present global structure. A 
generally well functioning democracy may thus have to agree to submit to judicial 
review in order to promote human rights elsewhere – as long as the burden is not 
unduly hard. 
Secondly, international judicial review of human rights can be important to 
correct the (few) human rights violations that can be expected even when 
democracies work very well. Mistakes occur even under the best procedures, and 
review of such decisions serve as a valuable safety mechanism. Human rights 
conventions address several such risks, inter alia the prerequisites for well 
functioning democratic procedures such as freedom of speech, free and fair 
elections, etc. Other risks are those that various groups tend to face under majority 
rule. The majority may exploit its powers, intentionally and knowingly or not, in 
ways that unduly harm those that happen to find themselves in the minority. Of 
course, many majority decisions may harm minorities. What counts as ‘undue’ 
harm? Some such harms occur under circumstances where the case for majority rule 
is weaker. Brian Barry noted that the case for majority rule is stronger when the 
stakes for each decision are roughly equal, and where there are rotating minorities 
((Barry, 1991)). Undue harm may thus arise for groups who find themselves in 
permanent minority when it comes to decisions. Some groups may also require 
unusual arrangements to secure the same needs as the surrounding majority. Such 
arrangements may include special protections, exemptions or support to maintain 
aspects of their own culture – ‘special needs’ with regard to freedom of religion, 
education and language, diet or other central components of what makes their lives 
go well in their eyes. A minority may also have special preferences which will lose 
out in all majoritarian decisions, each of which may be minor but with deleterious 
cumulative effect. Minorities may thus fear that they will be harmed even by 
apparently innocuous majoritarian decisions. The majority can offer some, but not 
many good reasons why they can be trusted to vote according to their sense of 
justice, even on such ‘minor’ issues. Standard mechanisms in a democracy that 
ensure responsiveness to the electorate will not work for such groups. For instance, a 
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small minority may never get attention from political parties that seek votes.  
An international human rights judiciary can serve to monitor the limits on 
decisions states can make within their borders. This safeguard reduces the 
reasonable fear that those in power will ignore their sense of justice with untoward 
effects on those who do not gain the majority vote. 
The third reason for judicial review is related to the second. Judicial review 
by bodies that are independent of the domestic government may provide citizens 
much needed assurance about others’ compliance – including that of their 
government. Such a mechanism helps convince ‘contingent compliers’ that the 
government will reliably continue to pursue acceptable outcomes.  Compared to 
other modes of governance, democratic arrangements not only have better 
mechanisms to ensure that authorities reliably govern fairly and effectively, but they 
also help provide public assurance that so is the case ((Przeworski et al., 1999), 
(Shapiro, 2001), (Pettit, 2000)). Party contestation and media scrutiny help align the 
interests of the subjects to those of their rulers, and contribute to make the 
institutions trustworthy (Fabre 2000, 83). Judicial review to protect human rights 
may provide another trust-building measure. With such review, those who fear that 
they will regularly be outvoted can be somewhat more certain that the majority will 
not subject them to undue domination, risks of unfortunate deliberations, or 
incompetence. This safeguard reduces reasons to fear that those in power will ignore 
their sense of justice, with untoward effects on minorities. This is a reason for such 
judicial review that may hold both for citizens and politicians: those citizens who can 
expect to sometimes find themselves in the minority – and that would be most 
citizens – will have more reason to expect that the majority will not abuse its powers. 
And politicians will be able to rely on citizens’ duty of justice a bit more, also those 
who find themselves in more or less permanent minority, because the procedures of 
judicial review will make it public knowledge that abuse of power is less likely. 
As an example, in 2011, of the 955 applications against the UK that the ECtHR 
decided, the government was found to violate the ECHR in only eight cases ((Bratza, 
2012)). Since the very large majority of cases show the government to be in 
compliance with its obligations under ECHR even when alleged victims think 
otherwise, the ECtHR thus serves to assure the citizens that this particular 
government generally merits compliance. One implication of this argument is that 
we must assess the human rights judiciary, and reform proposals thereof not only by 
whether they enhance compliance with human rights within states, but whether they 
also provide public assurance thereof. 
To conclude, note that a central normative issue is whether the benefits of the 
human rights judiciary – duly modified to provide the benefits indicated above - do 
indeed provide benefits to some, without imposing burdens of similar weight or 
urgency on others. One remark on such normative assessments is in order: The 
stakes are contested. Even when judicial review works as it should in stopping a 
legislative act, some will regret what they see as a loss to the democratic quality of the 
decision, since a majority decision is overturned. Some regard these losses as high – 
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and question the likely gains (cf. (Bellamy, 2007)). On the other hand, some such 
limitations on the scope of legislatures’ authority, and bodies entrusted to uphold 
such limitations, are not necessarily nondemocratic. Indeed, minority protections of 
some kind, with authority placed outside the legislature itself, may be a component 
of any set of workable majoritarian democratic institutions worth respecting.  All 
institutions must have a specified scope of authority, and a legislature which is 
corrected when it oversteps its authority is not obviously overruled in a 
nondemocratic way. Which bodies may be best placed and authorized in what ways to 
provide such benefits remains an open question. We now turn to some details about 
how the ECtHR may be modified to enhance its legitimacy.7 Recall that the 
normative assessment should apply an institutional perspective, including the 
broader impact of the human rights judiciary beyond any single state. That is, the 
subject of comparison is not how things would have turned out in the absence of 
institutions. Instead, we should compare the current ECHR regime with the best 
alternative institutions for binding collective action.8 Recall that  the ‘institutions’ to 
be assessed must be the practice of the human rights judiciary as a whole, as the 
courts and treaty bodies apply to both well functioning democracies and other stat. 
We must also recall the need not only that states comply with human rights, but also 
that citizens are assured that such is the case. In the case at hand, the comparison 
should be with democratic legislatures of varying human rights records, without 
such an international judicial review of human rights, and with an improved ECHR.  
4. A partial defense of the ECtHR 
We now return to several of the criticisms presented in section 2 that the ECtHR 
suffers from various legitimacy deficits. I shall suggest that some objections are not 
well targeted against the practices of the ECtHR, partly due to the division of 
responsibility between it and national authorities, and the different roles of 
legislators and of judiciaries. Other challenges merit much scrutiny. 
With regard to charges of ineffectiveness expressed in the large backlog, 
consider several factors that alleviate the charge against the ECtHR. Recall that 
analyses of the case load indicates that more than 90% of all applications are deemed 
inadmissible ((European Court of Human Rights, 2012b)). That is: individuals have 
been mistaken in assuming that the Court has the authority to decide on the case. 
Some ways to reduce this number are already established, such as making it easier 
for potential applicants to understand whether they should petition the Court at all, 
and to have a quick review process by a single judge. An important consideration is 
to ensure that potentially well-founded cases receive careful treatment.   
Another major cause of backlog are repetitive cases. For 34,000 of the pending 
cases the Court has already delivered judgments finding similar violations of the 
ECHR, but where the state knowingly flout its obligations to take steps to prevent 
future violations. That some states fail to so comply with the ECtHR is certainly a lack 
of legitimacy of the Court, but one of compliance rather than its own effectiveness. 
Indeed, the Court has established a streamlined procedure for these cases, using 
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three-judge committees.  
Finally, when it comes to effectiveness, we can note that of the 47 countries 
subject to the ECtHR, 5 were responsible for nearly half of the violations in 2011: of 
the 1157 judgments determining violations in 2011, Turkey 174, Russia 133, Ukraine 
105, Greece 73, Poland 71, ((European Court of Human Rights, 2011)).  I thus submit 
that the main sources of ineffectiveness of the ECtHR in processing cases are partly 
being addressed, and partly due to states’ noncompliance. 
We now turn to some of the concerns about the legality of the ECtHR. The 
concern is whether the ECtHR’s practice of ‘dynamic interpretation’ goes too far 
beyond the intentions of the signatories and hence beyond its’ legal authority. The 
ECtHR openly acknowledges that it develops the standards of the ECHR, eg. in light 
of new social or legal circumstances. The principle of dynamic interpretation tends to 
promote judicial activism. The ECtHR has declared that “the Convention is a living 
instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.” (Tyrer 
v. UK, no 5856/72 (1977), “in a manner which renders its rights practical and 
effective, not theoretical and illusory. “ (Goodwin v. UK [GC], no 17488/90(2002) paras 
74-5). The Court typically justifies such new interpretations by claims that there is 
broad consensus across most states in Europe ((European Court of Human Rights, 
2010)). Be that as it may, it seems clear that the signatories will sometimes be bound 
in ways not foreseen when they consented. This will seem at clear odds with the 
doctrine of ‘Restrictive interpretation in favour of state sovereignty’ which entailed 
that treaties should be interpreted so as to minimize restrictions on state sovereignty 
((Crema, 2010)):  
If the wording of a treaty provision is not clear, in choosing between several 
admissible interpretations, the one which involves the minimum of 
obligations for the Parties should be adopted. 
(Interpretation of Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne, Advisory 
Opinion, 1925 PCIJ Series B, No. 12, cited in (Crema, 2010), 685) 
 In response, several arguments defending this practice in general seem to 
have merit. Firstly, one may challenge the relevance of the old case, arguing that the 
ICJ no longer relies on the minimum rule has departed from relying on the 
minimum rule ((Crema, 2010)). Secondly, such a development is not unique to the 
ECtHR. To the contrary, ‘dynamic’ or ‘evolutive’ interpretation of treaties is wide 
spread.  
Thirdly, given relevant changes to the facts or other circumstances, the treaty 
will have to be interpreted in new ways insofar as the object and purposes of the 
treaty diverge from the individual treaty provisions. Something will have to give, 
and thus necessitate ‘dynamic’ interpretation. The question is rather which 
adjustments should be made, by what guiding principles. What is special with 
human rights treaties is that the doctrine of Restrictive Interpretation seems quite 
inappropriate. In general this doctrine is no longer adhered to, witnessed by the 
absence of this doctrine in the Vienna Convention. Interpretations now instead focus 
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more on the object and purpose of the specific treaty.  And in particular, t is not at all 
obvious that this contested principle is appropriate for human rights treaties. They 
differ from other conventions in being explicitly aimed to protect individuals from 
their own state. The convention’s rights are thus intended to limit state sovereignty, 
in ways that do not depend on whether other states violate such rights of their own 
citizens. The ECtHR applies a Principle of Effectiveness: The choice of interpretation 
should not be one which limits the obligations of the parties to the greatest degree, 
but must rather be appropriate to the aim and object of the treaty: to secure the aims 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Airey v Ireland, no 6289/73 (1979), 
Artico v Italy, no 6694/74 (1980)). The fact that an interpretation of such rights will be 
a stronger constraint on state sovereignty can hardly be decisive against such 
interpretations.  
Fourthly, this practice seems at least in principle to be in accordance with the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties article 31 (1), which lists the most 
frequently utilised interpretative methods: good faith, literal and contextual 
interpretation and interpretation in light of a treaty’s object and purpose. Leaving aside 
the normative significance of states’ intentions when signing a treaty, it thus seems 
clear that since the VCLT allows dynamic interpretation guided by such factors, it is 
reasonable that states’ intentions when signing treaties have included such dynamic 
interpretation since “it is now firmly rooted in the international law on 
interpretation." ((Schlütter, 2012)).   
A final concern about the legitimacy of the ECtHR is that it grants undue 
power to non-accountable judges. This creates a risk of states being subject to the 
rule not of law but of lawyers, at odds with standards of legality or the normative 
standard to avoid domination generally. Some such risks arise for all courts, but 
increase for international courts, such as the ECtHR.  
There thus seems to be at least two different though related kinds of concerns 
concerning the judges. Firstly the lack of accountability of various kinds which raises 
risks of domination by judges, and secondly the epistemic risks concerning decisions 
made by distant judges unfamiliar with domestic circumstances and expectations.  
With regard to the risk of domination, judges who are insulated from political 
pressure may well enjoy greater freedom to stand up to power, but they are also 
politically unaccountable and hence more likely to ignore citizens’ legitimate claims. 
These risks would seem to be compounded by several features of the ECHR and its 
Court: 
- Judges on international courts and treaty bodies may be less subject to peer 
pressure and less steeped in a domestic judicial culture; and their selection is not 
always based on merit but sometimes seem to stem from an opaque mix of nepotism 
and diplomatic strategy. Thus there is an added risk that judges’ discretion is 
exploited in the service of some states’ international objectives. 
- Abuse of judicial power is more likely when legislation is more indeterminate, as 
are many parts of treaties such as the ECHR, and with an established practice of 
dynamic interpretation ((Letsas, 2007)). 
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- Treaties – human rights treaties as much as others - are cumbersome to amend, 
since unanimity is required. Partly for this reason, the ECtHR has been forced to 
engage in quite drastic interpretations.  
There are thus risks that unelected judges of a review court will abuse their 
discretionary powers, unchecked by accountable politicians. This fear looms 
especially large with regard to treaty organs.  
In partial response, these fears are somewhat alleviated insofar as the judges 
are still subject to professional standards and various forms of non-electoral 
accountability. This even holds for members of international courts and treaty 
bodies. Such bodies are subject to “supervisory accountability” and “fiscal 
accountability” by the various signatory states – especially toward the more 
powerful states ((Grant, 2005), 37).  The risks of unchecked judges may seem larger 
for international courts, which might be thought problematic also by those who 
otherwise endorse a domestic division of power. “They are influenced by a host of 
structural, political and discursive constraints that states can manipulate ex ante and 
ex post, as well as by the pressures of professional and personal socialization within 
a global judicial community.” ((Shany, 2012), referring to (Helfer and Slaughter, 
1997)). 
The second risk is epistemic: that judiciaries generally – and international 
courts and tribunals in particular – are unfamiliar with the relevant details of the 
case. This is one reason why several critics warn that the deliberation by courts 
generally is of no better quality than the legislative debates. Many fear that the 
solutions rendered by judges are skewed or ill informed since they are typically 
drawn from a narrow segment of society. Their decisions are for this and other 
reasons likely to be worse than those of legislatures and bureaucracies. The latter 
know more about the situation on the ground ((Sunstein, 1996)). Some make the 
point by comparing cases, such as the abortion debate in the U.S. Supreme Court 
and British House of Commons ((Waldron, 2005)). Others argue on principle: Mark 
Tushnet holds that “Democratic faith in the people's judgment means that the 
arguments liberals deploy in court should be just as good in the political arena” 
((Tushnet, 2005)). Some arguments are empirical generalization, or doubts, e.g. 
against Dworkin’s assertion ((Dworkin, 1986), 375) that courts secure social reform 
and justice more effectively than do legislatures (Tushnet 176).  
In the case of the ECtHR such risks of domination and of unfamiliarity about 
the facts should be reduced due to one of the principle of interpretation. That court 
(and perhaps other courts, cf. (Shany, 2005)) grants a Margin of Appreciation to the 
states: they are allowed some discretion in how to best secure the rights of their 
citizens, apparently on the basis of an assumption of subsidiarity picking up on the 
concerns about local knowledge. The national authorities are thought better placed 
than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions (Fretté v. France 
no 36515/97 (2002)). Note that this rationale is sometimes at odds with the practice of 
the ECtHR to grant a wider margin where it discerns no common European 
standards or values that apply (cf. Handyside v UK [PC], no 5493/72 (1976, Muller 
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1988 (against obscene paintings), Rees (on transsexuals), cf. Bernhardt 1994). Some 
observe that this margin seems to be shrinking ((Arai-Takahashi, 2001), 201). Insofar 
as this is correct, it may be due to the harmonization of European laws, which would 
lead to clearer and more broadly shared European standards.  
Even with the caveat of the Margin of Appreciation doctrine, does the ECtHR 
subject governments – not to mention citizens - to unjustified discretion by 
unaccountable judges? Indeed, this doctrine may reduce the epistemic risks, but 
leaves some risks concerning domination. Thus critics may suspect that the ECtHR 
carefully picks its fights to maintain its own legitimacy. It may grant powerful states 
a greater margin of discretion than other states. 
While such fears of domination and ignorance should give rise to concern, the 
weight of worry is limited. Firstly, with regard to the epistemic concerns: one reason 
why a judiciary may make better decisions – and indeed induce more compliance 
((Shany, 2012)) -  is that it may therefore be, and be regarded as, more impartial 
among the parties. Such impartiality may be enhanced by the fact that few of the 
international judges can be suspected of parochial ties to either party to a conflict, 
and that they instead must rely on facts presented on behalf of the parties. They may 
indeed be better placed to spot widely shared yet mistaken assumptions that 
particular national ‘local’ human rights-violating practices are ‘necessary’ to secure 
certain objectives.  
Secondly, we should keep in mind that the gains and risks of judicial review 
by a court are different from those of a legislature. We are concerned only with weak 
judicial review, where a court observes that there is a conflict between a piece of 
legislation and treaty obligations, but does not find the law invalid, and does not 
replace it. Instead, the court warns of a conflict among norms, and returns the 
dilemma to the democratically accountable legislature. So it is not appropriate 
simply to compare the failure rates of courts and legislatures. The possible risks are 
different than the risks a citizen faces from a legislature.  
A court that performs judicial review may suffer two types of malfunction, be 
they the result of epistemic lapses or abuse of discretion. 1) ‘False negatives,’ where 
the court stops normatively unobjectionable legislative acts. The legislature is then 
asked to – unnecessarily - revise its legislation to avoid alleged normative problems 
mistakenly labeled such by the court. 2) ‘False positives’ occur when a court fails to 
prevent normatively unacceptable legislative acts. In these cases the vital interests of 
some segment of the population are violated, the existence of judicial review 
notwithstanding. One of the crucial normative questions arise in the former cases, 
when a body such as the ECtHR has made a false negative decision, and thus when a 
parliament is urged to change its decisions but where this has not been necessary to 
protect citizens’ vital interests – and where these changes are detrimental to some 
other individual.  I suggest that this burden is limited: often a legislature will be able 
to find constructive responses that respect citizens vital interests to the requisite 
degree. After all, the ECtHR leaves it the national authorities to decide how to adjust 
domestic policies, legislation or constitution to avoid future violations. It is for the 
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Committee of Ministers – which is indirectly democratically accountable (albeit not 
to a unified European ‘demos’) to decide whether these changes suffice. 
Thirdly, the range of issues where the ECtHR may intervene is limited in 
several ways. An indication of such limits is that 90% of all applications to the 
ECtHR are found to be inadmissible. Furthermore, the area of intervention into 
legislative acts is mainly limited in the case of the ECHR to civil and political rights 
and equal treatment by public authorities. The more contested topics such as 
weighing the priority of various social and economic rights and shaping welfare 
policies fall somewhat beyond the scope of the ECHR – though the court has taken 
on some such issues ((Palmer, 2009)). And the Margin of Appreciation limits the 
scope of interventions by the ECtHR, especially on issues where they perceive no 
broad European overlap of values.  
 Fourthly, with regard to the discretion of judges, we must first keep in mind 
the comparative perspective: if we want international judicial review based on 
treaties in order to secure effective human rights on the ground, the alternatives to 
dynamic interpretation may be even worse: judges applying outdated norms or 
‘original intent’ to current circumstances. It is not at all clear that such interpretive 
practices can provide effective protection. Moreover, the ‘unaccountable’ judges do 
not enjoy a completely unregulated liberty to interpret the ECtHR any way they 
want. Peer pressure and professional socialization does, and should, serve to 
constrain such interpretations – albeit in quite other ways than we should expect 
among democratically accountable representatives. The appropriate, responsible 
consideration of reasons may well be different for judges who should largely 
interpret texts. The trustworthiness of judges in these regards may well be enhanced 
by insulation from, rather than responsiveness to, citizens’ express preferences (cf. 
(Moore, 2001, Ferejohn, 2002)).We thus see the ECtHR engaged in several 
institutionalized dialogues with other parts of the human rights judiciary such as 
national apex courts, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  
The upshot of these observations is that the ‘democratic deficit’ of the practice 
of the ECtHR is not as severe as some critics might charge, due to features of the soft 
review, and the interpretive principles the Court applies. 
Such disclaimers notwithstanding, is the defense of democratic rule 
compatible with judicial review by courts such as the ECtHR, of the legislation 
decided by elected representatives?  
Valuable contributions contest whether the best interpretations of ‘democracy’ 
and ‘legitimacy’ in fact support judicial review (Ely (Ely, 1980); (Dworkin, 1986), 356; 
(Freeman, 1990); (Fabre, 2000); (Tamanaha, 2004)); arguments that have been 
challenged by skeptics of judicial review. The aim here is not primarily to advance 
that debate. Rather, the concern is also to check whether their concerns also apply to 
the ECHR. 
5. Reform Proposals Considered 
We may now return to the reform proposals offered to enhance the legitimacy of the 
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ECtHR. The general tendency of the UK proposals was to grant domestic bodies 
more authority regarding human rights review rather than to leave that power with 
the ECtHR; and formalize some aspects of current practice as amendments to the 
treaty. 
Firstly, consider the suggestion to include the Principle of Subsidiarity and the 
Margin of Appreciation in the treaty. In political terms such amendments are 
unlikely since they require unanimity. Be that as it may, it is not clear how such a 
reform may improve the legitimacy of the ECtHR. One concern of the UK is clearly 
to reduce the likelihood of the Court finding the UK in violation of the ECHR, thus 
respecting domestic democratic sovereignty more. This reduces the risk of ‘false 
positives’, i.e. of the Court preventing normatively unobjectionable policies. 
Moreover, the formalization reduces the risk of domination by the judges of the 
Court, by limiting and specifying their discretion. On the other hand, the risks of 
such reforms are high, for at least two reasons. The normative basis of these two 
principles is obscure with regard to human rights. Considerations of subsidiarity do 
not support placing protection of human rights with the national bodies alone. To 
the contrary, international human rights have as their objective to protect individuals 
against abuse by precisely such bodies. Domestic authorities should thus not have 
the sole responsibility, since that would make theme judges in their own case. 
Reliance on subsidiarity would rather support a multi-level sharing of responsibility, 
where the regional or international level has the limited responsibility to review the 
actions of the national ((Follesdal, 2011 )) . Similarly, a margin of appreciation based 
on respect for local circumstance and culture stands in clear tension with the 
protection of human rights; for instance when it comes to the interests of minorities 
and women that the ‘culture’ of a domestic dominant group often ignores or 
overrules. Furthermore, a formalization of these doctrines will most likely require 
the Court to apply the same margin of appreciation and similar respect for 
subsidiarity to all states, regardless of their general willingness to comply with the 
ECHR. Thus the reform might reduce the risks of domination and illegality, but at 
the cost of effective human rights protection furthering the three objectives discussed 
in section . Be that as it may, the central issues seem to remain how to determine and 
assess the appropriate Margin of Appreciation,   
The third proposal concerned which cases the ECtHR should take on. The 
Court should not consider an application “if it is the same in substance as a matter 
that has been examined by a national court taking into account the rights guaranteed 
by the Convention, ((UK Government, 2012), para 23 b).  There are only two 
exceptions: if “the Court considers that: i) The national court clearly erred in its 
interpretation or application of the Convention rights; or ii) The application raises a 
serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention;..."  The 
aim of this proposal is again to reduce the workload of the ECtHR, by reducing the 
authority of the Court vis-à-vis national bodies, in particular to reduce the number of 
false negatives. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the Court will also suffer. One 
reason is that the ECtHR may hesitate to thus criticize a national court for having not 
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only erred but clearly erred. Similar chilling effects may have occurred in Sweden 
which until 2011 allowed the judiciary to arrest legislation only if parliament has 
committed a ‘manifest error’  ((Nergelius, 2009)), and in Finland whose Constitution 
requires there to be an ‘evident conflict’ (Section 106) for judicial review ((Ojanen, 
2009)). In effect, this proposal would seem to remove the right of individuals to 
petition the Court. For citizens in well functioning democracies the added protection 
by the ECtHR may not be large, but the risks of this proposal seem clearly larger for 
citizens in less human rights compliant states. These effects must also be taken into 
account – it is not sufficient to dismiss the ECtHR because its benefits are small for 
citizens of the UK. Moreover, some of the benefits this proposal aims for are already 
secured. The Court already seems to pay attention to how carefully national courts 
have sought to interpret the ECHR, so that it is more likely to grant a Margin of 
Appreciation when there is evidence of such careful balancing (ref).   
  
6 Some remaining challenges 
The partial rebuttal of criticisms of the ECtHR and judicial review of human rights 
more generally should not be overdrawn. I conclude by pointing to some areas 
where such review should continue to spur caution and critical attention. 
Firstly, human rights treaties are not exempt from criticism de lege ferenda, as 
to the substantive content of the norms. For instance, it often remains to be argued 
whether these specific legal human rights, applied by international treaty organs, are 
suitable and reliable means to protect the best interests of individuals against 
‘standard threats’ that arise in complex modern states. Note that this may one reason 
in partial defense of Ron Hirschl’s criticism of granting judges powers of judicial 
review. He argues that such authority does not in the end promote "progressive 
concepts of distributive justice" ((Hirschl, 2004), 13). While this may be correct and 
lamentable, we must also insist that the role of international judicial review may well 
be more limited in aspiration: Its aim is more modest, and less contested than a full 
fledged standard of socioeconomic egalitarianism. 
Secondly, the quality of judicial deliberation merits further scrutiny. The 
patterns of actual debates and decisions in the ECtHR and other courts compared to 
those in legislatures are indeed a crucial empirical issue relevant for assessing their 
normative legitimacy. However, the relevant data must go beyond one particular 
case, such as the abortion debate in the US and the UK. (pace (Waldron, 2005)). There 
are several reasons for this. The normative theory I laid out above holds that we 
must compare institutions and practices, so our concern must be general tendencies 
rather than single results. And there are institutional factors why courts and 
parliaments should pursue and weigh different reasons and concerns – such as 
rights – differently, in light of their different social functions. Judges’ discretion 
should be more limited than that of legislatures, to interpretation of legal texts. So 
different modes of reasoning are to be expected. Furthermore, we may want to study 
how different rules affect the deliberations of parliaments, e.g., as Steiner et al. 
19 
 
   
explore ((Steiner et al., 2005 André, Spörndli, Markus, and Steenbergen, Marco R., 
2005 #40920)).  
Some scholars, including Tushnet, have suggested on more principled 
grounds that a democrat should hold that the arguments deployed in court “should 
be just as good in the political arena” ((Tushnet, 2005)).  I beg to disagree, for at least 
two reasons. 1) There are institutional factors – mandate, rules, culture − that 
legitimately lead the two kinds of bodies to pursue and weigh different reasons and 
considerations differently. Surely, some policy choices a legislature must make 
should reflect the comprehensive set of preferences of representatives – both self 
interested and other regarding – and not only the elements relevant for a court. 
Majority rule may then be a plausible decision rule to maximize preferences over 
time. Judges’ discretion, on the other hand, is largely limited to interpretation of 
legal texts, while there is clearly leeway in such interpretation. It would seem that 
peer pressure and professional socialization does, and should, serve to constrain 
such interpretations in quite other ways than we should expect among 
democratically accountable representatives. Thus the appropriate, responsible 
consideration of reasons may well be different, and the trustworthiness of legislators 
and judges in these regards may well be enhanced by insulation from, versus 
responsiveness to, citizens’ express preferences, respectively (cf. (Moore, 2001, 
Ferejohn, 2002)). This is not a rebuttal of Tushnet’s concern, but rather indicates that 
quite other sorts of arguments seem appropriate, also among democrats, on behalf of 
the reasoning of judges in general, and of the ECtHR in particular.  
2) recall that judicial review is a safety mechanism, not a replacement for 
democratic deliberation. Waldron also grants the value of weak judicial review as a 
safety mechanism, since legislators might not be able to see the issues of rights 
embedded in the proposal and its future applications ((Waldron, 2006), 1370). The 
risks are different for such safety mechanism, as compared to legislation. So it is not 
appropriate simply to compare the failure rates of courts and legislatures. We must 
assess the losses imposed on those whose human rights are overruled against the 
interests of a majority that cannot be pursued in the ways originally thought. 
 
A third source of worry about international judicial review is that judicial 
solutions will likely be worse than those of legislatures and bureaucracies, because 
the latter know more about the situation on the ground. In response, note there are 
several features of the ECtHR that renders this worry less weighty – but which also 
create other normative challenges. 1)  the doctrine of the Margin of Appreciation 
explicitly recognizes and seeks to respond to this concern. 2)  a judge from the 
accused country is always ex officio member of the ECtHR, precisely to provide some 
such relevant information. 3)  the judges’ background varies to some extent, so that 
the ECtHR as a whole has members with experience of government administration 
and human rights activism – as well as academia and service on the bench. 
Moreover, we may also use the distance of international judges engaged in judicial 
review in their favour: their unfamiliarity with local conflicts and cultural mores, 
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and their lack of stakes in the result, reduces the risk that the judges will subject a 
minority to willful domination. These responses should not lead us to conclude that 
this concern is completely without merit. In particular, it remains to be determined 
whether the ‘Margin of Appreciation’ respects the domestic democratic process 
appropriately, and the vital interests of individuals. I return to this below.  
 
A fourth normative concern, and related to this, the independence and 
professional quality of the judges on the courts – including the ECtHR – may be 
challenged. For instance, regarding the ECtHR, some scholars suggest that while the 
judges often seem sufficiently insulated from national pressures (, 29), several judges 
are selected by their government on quite other bases than judicial quality. The 
concerns about bias and independence are clearly worth further attention.  
 
Fifthly, with regard to the interpretive practices of the ECtHR, it remains to be 
determined whether the dynamic ‘margin of appreciation’ overlaps reasonably well 
with the scope of discretion states arguably need to accommodate local 
circumstances and expectations. Does this practice of recognizing such a margin, 
combined with the doctrine of dynamic interpretation, reliably help secure citizens’ 
best interests against flaws in majoritarian legislation? There is no obvious reason to 
believe this Margin overlaps precisely with the scope of the normatively permissible. 
There is no obvious reason to believe a broad consensus among European legal 
systems will always tend to converge on the normatively legitimate. And there is a 
real risk that ECtHR will seek to avoid taking controversial decisions against a 
powerful state, and instead grant that the issue falls within the margin of 
appreciation. Finally, the risk of political appointees raise the specter that judges will 
be affected by foreign policy concerns, rather than the best interests of individuals. 
 
I have addressed some of the concerns that the ECtHR suffers from a lamentable 
‘legitimacy deficit.’ Some may see such review as central to the Rule of Law, and in 
turn as crucial to a domestic and international constitutionalism worth respecting. At 
the same time, the literature reveals a long list of misgivings of such constraints on 
domestic democratic decision-making. We have reviewed some of the recent 
criticism against the ECtHR, and some of the recent proposals for reform of the 
ECtHR. To assess such criticisms and proposals I have explored some of the social 
functions that such judicial review of human rights may play, and laid out how such 
treaty organs may be defended in principle, and in practice in the case of the ECtHR. 
I have also argued that several issues remain unresolved, before we can conclude 
that the ECtHR and other such bodies are normatively defensible. The answers 
require both normative and empirical contributions, when we we ask whether these 
practices, better than the alternatives, provide citizens reasons to trust their 
authorities: that the norms and institutions in place are just, and that others in their 
societies act as they ought. Not only must the judges of such treaty bodies ensure 
that justice is done, but the institutions as a whole must also give assurance to 
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